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Abstract
The budget forms the legal basis of government spending. If a budget is not in place at
the beginning of the scal year, planning as well as current spending are jeopardized and
government shutdown may result. This paper develops a continuous-time war-of-attrition
model of budgeting in a presidential style-democracy to explain the duration of budget
negotiations. We build our model around budget baselines as reference points for loss
averse negotiators. We derive three testable hypotheses: there are more late budgets, and
they are more late, when scal circumstances change; when such changes are negative rather
than positive; and when there is divided government. We test the hypotheses of the model
using a unique data set of late budgets for US state governments, based on dates of budget
approval collected from news reports and a survey of state budget o¢ cers for the period
1988-2007. For this period, we nd 23 % of budgets to be late. The results provide strong
support for the hypotheses of the model.
Keywords: government budgeting, state government, presidential democracies, political econ-
omy, late budgets, scal stalemate, war of attrition
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1 Introduction
In the Summer of 2009, the state of California captured national headlines by failing to enact a
budget before the beginning of the scal year. In fact, the situation in California was so severe
that the state could not meet its obligations and began issuing IOUs to cover payments to
local governments, private contractors, and taxpayers. After 24 days of negotiations beyond the
scal year deadline between Republican governor Arnold Schwartzenegger and the Democratic-
controlled state legislature, a budget was approved. California is not alone in nishing its
budget late: in 2009, eleven states failed to approve a budget before the beginning of the scal
year,1 and in our entire sample, which covers the 48 continental states in the years 1988-2007,
23% of all budgets were approved after the scal year deadline. Delayed appropriations are
even more common at the federal level: Meyers (1997) reports that in the period 1977-97, 68
percent of all federal appropriation bills were enacted after the beginning of the scal year.
In state governments in the United States, as across all political arenas and at all levels
of government, the government budget provides the legal foundation for government spending.
If a budget is not approved and enacted by the beginning of the scal year, the legal basis
for government spending is jeopardized, and the consequences can range from a continuation
of operations based on last years budget to partial government shutdown, depending on both
specic constitutional provisions and the overall institutional framework.
Late budgets are an important object of study for three reasons: Economic costs, as a
measure of legislative productivity, and as a measure of good governance. We address each in
turn. First, when state governments are unable to enact a full budget before the beginning of
a new scal year, they often resort to passing temporary budget bills that allow appropriations
for state government operations for a limited time only.2 Passing a temporary budget bill is not
always possible, however, in some cases because of state laws,3 and in other cases because of
political conict among state lawmakers. In the absence of a budget, many state governments
nd themselves in unknown legal territory. As a result, the consequences of budget delays
vary considerably across states, and sometimes even from year to year within the same state.
Some state governments stop paying their employees or withhold payments to state vendors
and contractors, providers of Medicaid, school districts and local governments. In the most
extreme cases, the state government shuts down all so-called "non-essential" services until a
new budget is in place. In addition, the mere threat of a late budget means that state agencies,
1These are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware (by one day), Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
2At the level of the federal government in the US, such bills are very common and known as "continuing
resolutions." When such resolutions fail, the result may be government shutdown, witnessed most recently for
the case of the US federal government in 1996; see Meyers (1997) for an account.
3For an overview of procedures when the state budget is not passed by the beginning of the scal year, see
the National Conference of State Legislatures: http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=12616
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school boards and local government must spend time developing plans for what to do if a
stalemate extends beyond the end of the scal year, whcih complicates planning and may lead
to distorted decisions, such as hiring stops and hoarding of funds.4
Finally, state government creditworthiness may su¤er.5 In on-going, companion work (An-
dersen, Lassen and Nielsen, 2010), we investigate the consequences of late budgets for, among
other things, state borrowing costs. We nd that late budgets are associated with higher state
bond yields, as measured by the Chubb Relative Value Survey.6 Combining these estimates
with state debt stocks, we nd late budgets to be associated with substantial per capita interest
rate premiums. In short, late state budgets have signicant economic consequences within as
well as beyond state governments.
Second, our measure of budget negotiation duration provides a replicable, and easily ex-
tendable, measure of legislative gridlock, dened as the inability of the legislative and executive
branches to pass major legislation, at the state level. While a major part of the literature on
legislative gridlock has focsued on the US federal government (e.g. Mayhew, 1991; Binder,
1999), the logic behind the models and arguments applies to veto player democracies every-
where (Tsebelis, 2002). There is no generally agreed-upon measure of legislative gridlock (see,
e.g., Chiou and Rothenberg, 2008), but the budget arguably is the most important piece of
legislation for any executive and legislature. As recognized by Mayhew (1991), and emphasized
by Fiorina (1996) and Binder (1999), a true measure of gridlock should take into consideration
both the supply and demand for legislation; while low legislative output could reect high levels
of gridlock, it could equally well reect both a lack of demand for such output and a lack of
supply due to less frequent introduction of bills in periods where chances of passage are lower.
Our measure corrects for endogeneity both on the supply and the demand side, as the budgets
(re-)appearance on the legislative agenda is exogenously given.7
Third, timely budgets can, more generally, be viewed as a measure of good governance. In
his analysis of the e¤ects of social capital and the civic community on governance outcomes,
Putnam (1993) includes as one of his twelve indicators of institutional performance budget
4 In Maine in 1991, 10,000 state government workers were sent home without pay and all non-essential services
were closed. The budget was 18 days late. In Illinois, delays in payments from the state government creates
problems of liquidity for counties (County copes with cash ow", Lincoln Courier, April 8, 2010). In Michigan,
late state budgets a¤ect sta¢ ng and tuition decisions at schools and universities (Citizens Research Council of
Michigan: Late Budgets in Michigan, August 2009).
5On July 6, 2009, a few days after the beginning of the scal year, Fitch Ratings dropped Californias bond
rating to BBB, down from A minus (Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2009: Big Banks dont want Californias IOUs).
6The measure is based on a survey, carried out by the Chubb Corporation, of sell-side bond traders who
are asked to rate the relative yield on a 20 year general obligation bond for a state i compared with a similar
bond issued by New Jersey. See Lowry and Alt (2001) and Poterba and Rueben (2001) for more on the Chubb
Relative Survey and Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen (2010) for the analysis.
7Obviously, by restricting ourselves to studying budgets as a venue for gridlock, we leave out many important
policy areas; however, little agreement exists in the literature (Chiou and Rothenberg, 2008) on how to measure
major bills.
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promptness, dened as the (lack of) delay relative to the beginning of the scal year of the
approval of the budget by the regional councils. Putnam (1993, p. 65-67) argues that budget
promptness is a measure of a governments essential internal a¤airswhich, in turn, is one
component of an evaluation of good government.8 Our rich panel data set allows us to include
measures of social capital alongside economic and political explanatory variables to assess their
relative importance in explaining late budgets.
A nal reason for studying late budgets is methodological in nature: Empirical analyses
of budget outcomes and scal stabilizations are almost always based on models of political
bargaining, often involving a number of veto players, but the analyses are rarely based on data
on the actual bargaining process. As such, studies based on real-world data linking institutions
to outcomes by way of bargaining are essentially estimating reduced form-relationships by
stipulating an unobserved bargaining process, weakening the link between the proposed theory
and the empirical results. In contrast, our approach makes the bargaining process the center
of the analysis with the aim of evaluating directly the hypoteses about the bargaining solution
derived from the theoretical model.
We model the political bargaining proces as a war of attrition in the spirit of Alesina and
Drazen (1991), but we focus on the time to reach an agreement on the annual budget rather
than the delay in implementing crises-induced reforms. In our model, the two bargaining
parties su¤er costs from not being able to reach a deal. These costs may be political of nature,
because the public dislikes budget delays, or they may be personal, since legislators must spend
time and e¤ort to keep battling over the budget. When a party nds that it can no longer bear
the costs of continued bargaining, it concedes, and the opposing party is free to implement
its preferred policy. We derive the unique symmetric equilibrium of the bargaining game and
show that it implies a number of testable hypotheses. The three main predictions are: One,
changes in scal circumstances, regardless of direction, increase the expected duration of budget
stalemates; Two, the expected duration is higher in scal downturns than in upswings of similar
magnitudes; And three, divided government increases the expected duration.
Our modeling approach is based on the key assumption that bargaining over a government
budget is carried out with reference to a budget baseline. Budget baselines generally fall in
two categories: (1) nominal spending the previous year; or (2) current serviceswhich is the
provision of services nanced by the previous years spending. In US state governments, which
form the focus of our empirical analysis, Crain and Crain (1998) report that in the 1990s
34 states used last years spending level as baseline while the remaining 16 used a current
services baseline. While the determination of baselines themselves is also subject to political
8This sentiment is echoed among policy makers; for example, Scott Pattison, the current executive director
of the National Association of State Budget O¢ cers, notes that "a well-managed state would never, ever"
have a late budget (quoted from "Mischief After Midnight", governing.com, June 2009. Available online at
http://www.governing.com/article/mischief-after-midnight).
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manoeuvring and debate, a baseline remains, given the baseline regime, a common reference
point against which all changes being bargained over are compared; as noted by Schick (2007, p.
67) in the context of the US federal government budget, [o]nce a baseline has been constructed,
any variance from it due to legislation is measured as a policy change.
We combine the notion of a formalized reference point in the form of a budget baseline with
the behavioural assumption that budget negotiators have political preferences and that they
are loss averse over changes from the baseline, making the preferences a variant of Tversky and
Kahneman (1991). It is well documented that public responses to negative economic informa-
tion is greater than responses to positive information (Soroka, 2006), that negative attitudes
towards candidates have a greater impact on voting behavior than do positive attitudes (Ker-
nell, 1977), and that negative economic trends penalize incumbents while they reap few benets
from positive trends (Bloom and Price, 1975; Nannestad and Paldam, 1997). These observa-
tions are in accord with the di¤erential valuation of negative and positive political outcomes
reported in Quattrone and Tversky (1988), suggesting that voters exhibit loss aversion over
goods, services and transfers obtained from the public sector. We do not model the relation-
ship between voters and politicians; instead, we directly assume politicians to be loss averse,
which can either simply reect loss averse voters or reect the fact that politicians themselves
are subject to the same processes of preference formation as are voters. Loss aversion implies
a status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), or - in our model - more precisely, a
bias towards the baseline budget. This means that the opposing parties in our model nd it
relatively easy to agree on keeping the budget unchanged in years when scal conditions are
stable. When exposed to large changes in scal circumstances, however, their innate di¤erences
in policy preferences make the parties disagree over how to adapt to such changes, and long
stalemates become more likely. Because of loss aversion, this is more pronounced when scal
conditions change for the worse than when they improve.
We apply the model to data on US state government budget processes. Using state and
local newspaper sources as well as responses to a survey of state budget o¢ ces administered
for this purpose, we collect data on dates of nal budget enactment and compare these to the
beginning of the state governmentsscal years. Carrying out this comparison for all states
for every year since 1988 yields a replicable measure of budget lateness (as well as legislative
gridlock and governance).9
We nd that adverse changes in economic conditions, measured by the increase in unem-
ployment, substantially increases the duration of the budget negotiations: a one percentage
point increase in unemployment rate relative to the previous year increases the expected du-
9The Government Performnace Project at Pew Center of the States provides overall assessments of government
performance to produce an index of same. This index was employed by Knack (2002) in his cross-state analysis of
the e¤ects of social capital on governance. Budget timelinessis one of many factors included in this assessment,
but it is not reported separately nor is it based on hard data.
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ration of the budget negotiations by about a week in our preferred specication. Similarly,
divided government substantially increases both the risk of experiencing a late budget and
its duration, the latter by about two weeks. On the other hand, budget negotiations are, on
average, between one and two weeks shorter in election years.
The paper is structured as follows: The next subsection presents related literature, section
2 presents our theoretical model, and section 3 describes the collection and construction of
data. Section 4 describes the empirical specication and section 5 reports results. We provide
a discussion and some concluding remarks in the nal section.
1.1 Related literature
Our study of late budgets relates to a number of di¤erent literatures, in addition to the leg-
islative gridlock and good governance literature already mentioned. First, it is related to the
political reform literature, in particular the literature on scal adjustments in the face of large,
external shocks. This is evident not only from the descendancy of the model from the Alesina-
Drazen framework, but also from the fact that budget lateness, as will become evident from
the empirical analysis, is crucially related to an adverse economic environment and specic
political factors. However, the theoretical and empirical literatures on scal adjustments are
not concerned with annual budgets per se, but with scal imbalances over the medium- and
long-term, and have as a key parameter the economic costs of continuing conict.10 In contrast,
we set up a framework to cover all budgets, in normal times and economic crises alike, based
on political costs of bargaining rather than economic costs, and provide empirical evidence to
match the theory closely.
Second, our study is a part of the large literature on the e¤ects of political, economic
and institutional determinants of government budget outcomes. In this literature, government
budget outcomes, i.e. realized revenue and spending patterns, are related to partisan di¤erences
(Alt and Lowry, 2000), budget institutions (Poterba, 1994; Alt and Lowry, 1994; Poterba and
von Hagen, 1999) and political institutions (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2007). While most
theoretical work in this literature explicitly recognizes the bargaining nature of government
budgeting and policy determination, direct empirical tests based on quantitative data of the
theoretical claims regarding the bargaining process are, to our knowledge, non-existent.
Third, our paper is related to the concept of incrementalism as well as to the general public
administration literature on budgeting. Incrementalism in budgeting is traditionally associ-
ated with Wildavskys (1964) observations that government budgets are not re-calculated from
scratch every year but that they are rather, due to information processing costs, based, by-
and-large, on the previous years budget. Our approach, based on budget baselines as points
10 In a recent contribution to this literature, Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi (2006) provide an investigation of
the determinants of scal balance stabilizations across countries.
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of departure for budget negotiations, is not derived from incrementalism; if anything, as noted
by Schick (1980, p. 217), the adoption of the current services baseline institutionalized incre-
mentalism.11 The role of the status quo and agenda control in models of policy determination
was rst recognized by Romer and Rosenthal (1978).
Fourth, the paper is closely related to a small literature studying bargaining in positive
analyses of political and policy processes. Bargaining models are frequently employed in the
positive political economy literature, but, as noted above, most empirical studies go on to
evaluate economic and political outcomes directly, rather than studying the bargaining process
by which exogenous circumstances are translated into outcomes. Analyses linking formal bar-
gaining models to data on the bargaining process are rare outside of laboratory experiments,
but notable exceptions exist: Merlo (1997) and Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2005) exam-
ine government formation in Italy and parliamentary democracies, respectively, based on the
stochastic bargaining model proposed by Merlo and Wilson (1995). The duration of the gov-
ernment formation phase can be interpreted as a measure of the intensity of the conict, as
can the duration of the budget negotiation phase.
2 A Stylized Model of Budget Delays
We consider a government with two players, A and B, who must agree to pass a budget. The
players could be thought of as the executive vs. the legislature, or as majority leaders from
di¤erent chambers within the legislature. Each player has veto power, so that no one player
can pass a budget without the consent of the other player.
The government faces a given amount of revenue, y, which can be spent on two di¤erent
types of publicly provided goods, g1 and g2. There is a balanced budget constraint in place,
so any budget plan must satisfy g1 + g2 = y. All variables are measured in units per capita.
The players derive utility from both types of spending, but they disagree on the preferred
composition of total spending. An alternative interpretation is that g1 and g2 are public- and
private consumption, respectively, and that y is the tax base, assumed for simplicity to be equal
to income per capita. The tax rate is then equal to g1=y. In this interpretation, the conict
between the two players is over the size of the budget, rather than the composititon. Which of
these two alternative interpretations is the appropriate one depends on the relevant context in
which we wish to apply the models predictions. However, for consistency, we stick to the rst
interpretation in the following exposition.
The political game resembles the set-up in Alesina and Drazen (1991): The two players
engage in a war of attrition, during which the budget adoption is delayed. Delaying agreement
11The debate over incrementalism and alternative public administration models of budgeting cannot be done
justice here. For a critique of incrementalism, and an alternative budgetary theory, see Meyers (1996).
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is costly to both players. First, budget delays imply a political cost to those responsible, since
voters disapprove. And second, there is a personal cost of delay to the players involved, since
they must spend time and resources on negotiating, lobbying and servicing the press as long
as the adoption phase continues.
There may also be actual budgetary costs associated with delays. As explained above,
government agencies must spend time and e¤ort to deal with the delayed appropriations and
the possibility of shutdown of services, and this may divert resources away from provision of
public goods and services. This would suggest a negative relationship between the duration of
the delay and y in our model. However, to keep things simple we focus on the rst two types
of costs of delay and let y be constant over time.
The war of attrition ends when one of the players "concedes". We model our political conict
as a "winner-takes-all" game: once a player has conceded, the other player is free to choose
whatever composition of spending he prefers. Thus, as in Alesina and Drazens model, players
can only "win" or "lose". Endogenously determined compromises reached during negotiations
are ruled out, which is of course a major simplication.12
The players have reference-dependent preferences, so that budget outcomes (g1; g2) are
evaluated relative to a budget baseline, (gb1; g
b
2). To be specic, we assume that their preferences
over government spending can be represented by the utility functions
uA(g1; g2jgb1; gb2) =   v(g1   gb1) + v(g2   gb2) (1)
uB(g1; g2jgb1; gb2) = v(g1   gb1) +   v(g2   gb2)
where
v(x) =

x if x  0
x if x < 0
and  >  > 1
The parameter  captures that each player prefers spending on one type of good over the
other, other things equal, but they disagree on which of the two goods is preferable. With
 > 1, player A has a preference for spending on good 1, while player B prefers spending on
good 2. The players evaluate budget outcomes in terms of deviations from the baseline, using
the value function v(). The value function is everywhere increasing and has a kink at zero, as
suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1991).13 This implies that the players are loss-averse:
They dislike negative deviations from the baseline more than they like equal-sized positive
deviations.
12Hsieh (2000) provides an extension of a simplied Alesina-Drazen framework where the payo¤ distribution
at stabilization is determined endogenously in a formal bargaining process.
13Tversky and Kahneman also argued that in order to explain observed attitudes towards risk, the value
function must be concave in the positive domain and convex in the negative domain. This feature of the value
function is known as diminishing sensitivity. Since we are not explicitly interested in explaining attitudes towards
risk, we abstract from this feature and settle for the simpler, linear version adopted here.
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To see what our specication of preferences implies for budget outcomes, dene yb  gb1+gb2.
We label this the baseline revenue level. When y > yb the players face an opportunity to raise
spending on both types of goods over the baseline levels. Since  > 1, player A gets higher
marginal utility from raising g1 than from raising g2 whenever g2  gb2. Hence, player A would
never raise spending on good 2 above the baseline level. On the other hand, the assumption
 >  implies that player A does not wish to drive g2 below its baseline level. Player A thus
prefers the bundle (gb1+ y  yb; gb2) to all other feasible combinations of g1 and g2 when y > yb.
Correspondingly, the marginal benet to player A from raising g1 at the expense of g2 is positive
when g1 < gb1 and g2 < g
b
2, but negative when g1  gb1 and g2 < gb2. If given the opportunity,
player A will therefore choose the bundle (gb1; g
b
2   yb + y) when y < yb. Of course, player Bs
preferences imply the same choices, only with the goods reversed.
In words, whenever the players are given an opportunity to raise overall spending, they
will prefer to increase spending on their preferred good only, while leaving spending on the
other good unchanged. And whenever faced with a need to cut overall spending, the players
will prefer to keep spending on their preferred good unchanged, letting spending on the least
preferred good carry the entire burden of adjustment.
The assumption  >  is crucial for these results. Without this assumption, both players
would always prefer to spend the entire revenue on their own preferred good, irrespective of
the sign of y   yb. The interpretation is that the players are so averse to losses that they are
willing to sacrice increases in spending on their most preferred good in order to avoid even the
smallest cuts in spending on their least preferred good. Of course, this is an extreme prediction.
However, we believe that it does capture an important feature of scal policy: Spending cuts
carry a greater weight in the minds of citizens, in the public debate, and therefore also in the
minds of policymakers, than spending increases. Fiscal policymakers are therefore inclined to
avoid spending cuts, even at substantial opportunity costs.
The costs from a stalemate over the budget are individual-specic and linearly increasing in
the time until a concession occurs. Time is continuous and we normalize the start of the budget
adoption phase to t = 0. If a concession occurs at time t = T , the players incur disutility
Di = iT ; i = A;B (2)
The parameter i captures how costly delays are to player i. We assume that A and B
are independent and drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on an interval (; ]. As in
Alesina and Drazen (1991), we assume that i is private information to player i. The other
player does not observe the realized value of i but knows the distribution from which it is
drawn.
Total utility is given by the utility from the budget outcome minus the disutility from a
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delayed agreement. If player i ultimately wins the war of attrition at time t = T , his total
utility may then be written as
UWi (T ) = u
W  Di(T ) =

(y   yb)  iT if y  yb
 (yb   y)  iT if y < yb (3)
while the total utility of losing at time T is
ULi (T ) = u
L  Di(T ) =

(y   yb)  iT if y  yb
 (yb   y)  iT if y < yb (4)
The gain from winning is then straightforwardly computed as
UWi (T )  ULi (T ) = uW   uL =

(   1)(y   yb) if y  yb
(   1)(yb   y) if y < yb (5)
Note that the gain from winning is always positive, equal for both players and independent
of the time of concession. It is increasing in
y   yb, the absolute value of the deviation of
total revenue from its baseline. Note further that for a given value of
y   yb, the gain from
winning is higher if y < yb than if y  yb: because of loss aversion, the stakes are higher when
revenue drops below the baseline level than when it is above it.
Each player must now choose an optimal concession time Ti. This is the date on which
player i concedes and allows his opponent to choose her preferred spending plan, conditional
on the opponent not having conceded already. We assume that players choose Ti so as to
maximize their expected total utility. Expected utility depends on the utilities that the player
gets from winning and losing, respectively, as well as the probability of winning. Player i
wins whenever his chosen concession time exceeds that of his opponent. Let H(t) denote the
cumulative distribution function of the opponents optimal concession date, with associated
density function h(t).14 H(t) is of course endogenous, but it is exogenous as seen from the
point view of player i, since player i can in no way inuence his opponents choice of concession
time. Integrating over the opponents concession time, we can then express the expected utility
14As emphasized below, we concentrate on equilibria where each players concession time is a di¤erentiable
function of his type. This implies that H(t) is di¤erentiable, and that the density function h(t) does in fact
exist.
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of player i as a function of Ti as
EUi(Ti) =
TiZ
0
UWi (t)h(t)dt+
1Z
Ti
ULi (Ti)h(t)dt (6)
=
TiZ
0
UWi (t)h(t)dt+ (1 H(Ti))ULi (Ti)
If a positive, nite optimal concession time exists, it must then satisfy the rst-order con-
dition
dEUi(Ti)
dTi
=

UWi (Ti)  ULi (Ti)

h(Ti)  (1 H(Ti))i = 0 (7)
where we have used that @ULi (Ti)=@Ti =  i . Recall that the term in brackets is the gain from
winning, which does not depend on Ti. We may therefore write this term as uW   uL. We can
then rewrite the rst-order condition as
[uW   uL] h(Ti)
1 H(Ti) = i (8)
This representation of the rst-order condition has an intuitive interpretation: The left-hand
side is equal to the expected marginal benet of waiting one more instant to concede. This is
equal to the probability that the opponent will concede "within the next instant", conditional
on the fact that he has not already conceded, times the gain that follows if the opponent does
actually concede. The left hand side is equal to the marginal cost of postponing concession.
At the optimal concession time, the marginal benet and the marginal cost exactly balance.
We now look for a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each players optimal
concession time Ti is a di¤erentiable function of his type, Ti = T (i). In the appendix we
show that there exists a unique such equilibrium. The equilibrium function T (i) satises the
di¤erential equation
T 0(i) =  [uW   uL](i(i   )) 1 (9)
and the boundary condition
T () = 0 (10)
Combining equations (9) and (10) then gives the following explicit solution for T (i):
T (i) =

uW   uL 1

ln

i(   )
(i   )

(11)
The equilibrium distribution of concession times, H, is of course related to this solu-
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tion. More precisely, we may back out the equilibrium distribution by noting that H(t) =
Prob [T (j) < t] = Prob

j > T
 1(t)

, where T 1 is the inverse function to T .15
To understand the mechanisms of the game in the symmetric equilibrium, recall that when
deciding whether to concede or keep ghting, the players weigh the expected marginal benets
of a further delay against the marginal costs, i. The marginal benet consists of the conditional
probability that the opponent will concede "within the next instant", times the gain from
winning that follows if he actually does so. In the beginning of the conict, this marginal benet
can be shown to be exactly , implying that no player with i <  will concede immediately.
However, since opponents with high costs from delays will concede faster, the passage of time
without a concession makes players adjust their beliefs about their opponents costs downwards.
With the specic distributional assumption we have made about costs, it also implies that the
conditional probability that the opponent will concede within the next instant falls.16 Thus,
the marginal expected benet of postponing concession decreases over time, and after a certain
time it becomes so low that equation (9) exactly holds. This is the optimal time for player i
to capitulate and accept defeat.
A budget agreement is reached as soon as one of the players concedes. The date when this
happens is given by
T agree = min fT (A);T (B)g
Of course, T agree is a random variable. Using equations (11) and (5), and the fact that A and
B are independent and both uniformly distributed on (; ], we show in the appendix that the
expected date of agreement is
ET agree =

(   1)(y   yb)
 if y  yb
(   1)(yb   y)
 if y < yb (12)
where 
        (ln()  ln()) (   ) 2.
2.1 Predictions from the model
A number of predictions are immediately apparent from equation (12). First, large deviations
in revenue from the baseline level increase the expected time until concession. Since baseline
budgets are strongly linked to the previous budget, it follows that we should expect changes in
scal circumstances relative to the previous year, whether to the better or worse, to increase
the expected duration of budget stalemates. The intuition is that in years when revenue is
15The appendix also proves that the function T is strictly decreasing, so that the inverse function does exists.
16This conditional probability is equal to the hazard rate, h(T )=(1 H(T )). The assumption that the is are
uniformly distributed ensures that this rate is decreasing in T .
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stable, reference dependence and loss aversion imply that both players prefer to keep spending
levels unchanged. This consensus between players, which arises despite their innate di¤erences
in preferences, means that there is little at stake in the conict over the budget, and both
players will therefore prefer to concede quickly, rather than dragging the stalemate to a length
and incur the political costs associated with the delay. In contrast, in the face of large changes
in scal conditions, the players disagree on how to adapt to those changes. This increases
the stakes in the budget conict, and the opposing parties will be more willing to prolong the
stalemate in the hope of getting their preferred outcome.
Second, negative deviations from the baseline have a stronger impact on the expected
time of concession than positive deviations of the same size. Hence, the model suggests that
we should observe longer budget delays during scal downturns than during upswings. This
prediction follows directly from the assumption of loss aversion: since players dislike spending
cuts more than they like spending increases, it becomes extra important for them to control
the budget in years where revenue has dropped. Loosely formulated, "avoiding to lose" is a
stronger motivation to keep ghting than "hoping to win".
Based on the rst two predictions, we should expect to see longer and more frequent budget
delays in states where revenue is highly volatile. On the other hand, it is the need for spending
to adapt to changes in revenue, not the change in revenue in itself, which leads to delays in
our model. Going slightly outside the model, we would therefore expect scal institutions that
facilitate smoothing of uctuations over time to dampen the impact of revenue volatility.
A third prediction relates to the parameter . The larger  is, the stronger are the players
relative preferences for their favored types of spending, and the deeper is their disagreement
over how to react to a change in revenue from the reference level.  = 1 corresponds to a com-
plete consensus on the budget, in which case the model predicts immediate agreement always.
Naturally, signicant discrepancies between the policy preferences of the players involved in the
budget process are much more likely when there is divided partisan control of the government
than when all players belong to the same party. Thus, we expect budget stalemates to be
longer and more frequent when the two chambers in the legislature are controlled by di¤erent
parties, or when the legislature is controlled by the opposite party of the executive.
Finally, the expected date of concession is inversely proportional to the scale of the interval
(; ]. That is, multiplying  and  with a positive constant k implies that ET agree is multiplied
with k 1. Similarly, adding a positive constant to both  and  lowers ET agree.17 Hence, a
shift to the right in the distribution of the marginal costs of delay leads to shorter expected
stalemates. We therefore expect to see shorter delays when the political and personal costs to
17To see this, totally di¤erentiate equation (12) with respect to  and  and set d = d. This gives
dET agree=d =  [UW   UL](   ) 2( 

  ln( 

)   1) < 0. The term in the parentheses is positive since
ln(x) < x  1 for all x 6= 1.
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politicians of late budgets are high. This may for example be the case in election years: First,
electoral success is likely to depend on recent performance, so the political costs of delays are
extra high in such years. And second, legislators face an extra personal opportunity cost of
spending time on battling over the budget in election years, since they cannot devote their time
to campaigning for re-election until the budget is done. Institutional arrangements may also
inuence the political and personal costs of budget delays, an issue that we address further in
the empirical analyses below.
3 Dening and measuring late budgets
Budget processes vary considerably across US states. This complicates cross-state comparisons
of budget timeliness somewhat, since there is no obvious, universal denition of when, and by
how much, a budget is late. For any meaningful measure of budget lateness, one must identify
two points in time, namely 1) the date by which the budget is supposed to be enacted; and
2) the date on which it is actually enacted. To begin with the former, many state legislatures
face a deadline to pass the budget that is prior to the end of the scal year. For example,
the California state constitution requires that the legislature pass the budget bill before June
15, whereas the scal year starts on July 1st. Other state legislatures face constitutional or
statutory deadlines for ending their regular sessions. Whether such deadlines also constitute an
e¤ective deadline for passing the state budget varies from state to state, however, and is often
a question of interpretation. Moreover, while violations of pre-scal year deadlines are often
met with harsh criticism in news media, most of the political and economic costs of a budget
stalemate that we discussed in the introduction do not become relevant until the stalemate
approaches the end of the scal year. Most notably, government shutdowns can only happen if
the impasse extends into the new scal year. In our view, therefore, the ultimate deadline for
enacting a state budget will always be the end of the scal year.
Turning to the date of actual budget enactment, two natural candidates come to mind: the
date of nal legislative approval and the date of nal enactment. Final legislative approval is
achieved when the new budget has been passed in both chambers of the legislature in its nal
form. Final enactment is the event that formally makes the new budget become law. In most
cases, this happens when the governor signs the budget, but important exceptions exist: For
example, if the governor vetoes the entire budget, the legislature can in most states override
the veto by some super majority vote in both chambers, and the budget then becomes law
without the governors signature. In such cases we interpret the date of the legislative override
as the date of nal enactment. Furthermore, some states have a deadline for gubernatorial
action, and the governor may sometimes let the budget become law without actively signing it
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by letting this deadline expire. In these cases we use the date on which the deadline expired.18
For convenience, however, we shall henceforth simply refer to the date of nal enactment as
the date the budget was signed into law.
It is not obvious which of the two events most accurately captures the end of budget
negotiations. Sometimes, all conict is e¤ectively resolved when the budget has been passed by
both legislative chambers, and the governors signature appears to be a mere formality. This
speaks for using the date of legislative passage as the indicator of actual budget enactment.
In other cases, however, the conict over the budget is far from resolved with the legislative
passage. Many governors actively use their power to veto the budget - or the threat to do so
- to inuence the nal budget outcome. In such cases, the nal budget enactment, i.e. the
signing into law, is the appropriate indicator for the end of budget negotiations. Since this is
also what formally marks the end of the budget adoption process, we prefer the date when the
budget is signed into law as our indicator of budget enactment.19
Thus, our preferred measure denes a late budget as a budget that has been signed into
law after the end of the scal year, and we measure the length of the delay as the number
of days from the end of the old scal year to the date of nal enactment. We have also
experimented with two other measures, however, namely 1) the number of days from the state-
specic deadline for legislative passage of the budget to the date of actual legislative passage,
and 2) the number of days from the end of the old scal year to the date of legislative passage.
3.1 Budget enactment data
The data for the budget enactment dates were collected from three sources: (i) State leg-
islatureswebsites; (ii) Archived newspaper articles; and (iii) a survey sent to state budget
o¢ cers. Some state legislatureswebsites have detailed information on the status and histories
of all bills enacted in previous legislative sessions, including the budget bill(s). However, most
state legislaturesbill tracking tools only cover the most recent legislative sessions, if any. We
therefore supplemented with information from archived newspaper articles accessed via Newsli-
brary.com.20 Finally, we also sent a survey to state budget o¢ cers asking them to conrm the
18Another exception is Maryland, where the governor cannot veto the budget, which means that the budget
becomes law once it has been passed by both chambers in the legislature. Consequently, nal legislative passage
and nal budget enactment coincide in Maryland.
19Our measurement is further complicated by the fact that some states do not pass a single, all-encompassing
budget bill. Instead, their budgets consist of several individual appropriation bills. In such cases we do not
consider the budget fully enacted until the last appropriation bill for state operations has been enacted. Also,
state governments sometimes react to unexpected developments in state government nances by passing within-
scal year supplementary appropriation bills. We do not view such supplementary budget bills as part of the
budget adoption process that we are interested in, however, and we therefore restrict our attention to the budgets
as originally enacted.
20Newslibrary.com is an online newspaper archive that covers more than 2,500 news sources across the United
States. We also used The New York Times online archive on several occasions to access relevant news articles.
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data we had collected ourselves as well as provide us with the information that we had not been
able to nd via any of the other sources. Out of 48 states (we exclude Alaska and Hawaii), 19
responded to our survey. When overlapping, the data they reported were virtually identical to
the data we collected ourselves.21
In the survey, as well as in our own information search, we asked the following questions
for each legislative session in which a budget was adopted:
1. When did the regular session of the legislature start?
2. When was the executive budget proposal submitted to the legislature?
3. When was the deadline for the legislature to pass the budget?
4. When did the legislature pass the budget?
5. When was the budget signed into law?
Our main dependent variable, days_late, is constructed as the di¤erence between the answer
to question 5 and the last day of the old scal year. Note that this variable is uncensored,
so that both positive and negative values occur. For example, a value of days_late equal to
-5 means that the budget was signed into law ve days before the end of the scal year. We
also construct a binary variable, late_budget; that takes the value one if days_late is strictly
positive, and zero otherwise. In addition, we construct a censored variable, days_late_cens,
that sets all negative values equal to zero. Our two alternative measures, days_delayed; and,
days_delayed_FY , are constructed as the di¤erence between the answer to question 4 and i)
the answer to question 3, and ii) the last day of the old scal year, respectively. Binary and
censored versions of these variables are constructed in a similar way. Table 1 shows descriptive
statistics for all dependent variables.
<Table 1 about here [Descriptive statistics of dependent variables]>
For the years 1988-2007 we have recorded 167 cases where the budget was signed into law
after the beginning of the new scal year. This amounts to 23 percent of the budgets for which
we have data.22 Figure 1 gives a detailed picture of the distribution of days_late. There is
a clear e¤ect of the scal year deadline, as can be seen from the spike at zero. This spike
reects the great number of budgets that are enacted on the last day of the old scal year. The
21The instructions for the survey are available from the authors upon request. Table A1 in the appendix gives
details on the source of information on late budgets for each state.
22190 budgets (26%) received legislative passage after the legislatures state-specic deadline, while 119 (17%)
were nally passed by the legislature after the beginning of the new scal year.
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budgets that were signed into law after the beginning of the new scal year (days_late > 0)
were on average 31 days late. The variation is large, however, ranging from one day to almost
six months with a standard deviation of 36 days. 13 percent of the late budgets were signed
into law on the rst day of the scal year, while 33 percent were more than one month late.
<Figure 1 about here. [No. of days from end of scal year to nal budget enactment]>
Figure 2 illustrates the occurrences of late budgets over time. In addition to our preferred
denition of a late budget, the gure also displays the number of budgets that were passed by
the legislature after the state-specic deadline for legislative passage. Such delays are generally
much more common than delays that extend into the new scal year. For both measures,
budgets delays were frequent in the early 1990s and in the beginning of the new century. The
late 1990s were a period with relatively few late budgets.23
<Figure 2 about here. [The number late budgets over time, 48 states]>
Figure 3 illustrates the relative frequencies of late budgets for each of the 48 states in our
data set, using our preferred denition of a late budget (days_late > 0). In comparison, Figure
4 does the same for one of our alternative denitions (days_delayed > 0). Most states have
experienced at least once that the state legislature didnt live up to its deadline for budget
passage, while 22 states have experienced a budget enacted after the beginning of the new
scal year in the time period considered here. New York, North Carolina, California, Oregon
and Wisconsin score high on both measures of budget lateness, while Southeastern, Plains- and
Rocky Mountain states dominate the group that have never experienced any late budgets.
In what follows, we report results for our preferred denition of late budgets only. Table
A3 in the appendix reports results for our main explanatory variables of interest using the two
alternative denitions. A full set of results that parallel those reported below are available from
the authors upon request. In short, all of our main conclusions are highly robust to plausible
alternative denitions of a late budget.
<Figure 3 about here.[No. of budgets enacted after beginning of scal year, relative to total no.
of enacted budgets 1988-2007]>
<Figure 4 about here:[No. of budgets passed after legislatures deadline, relative to total no. of
enacted budgets 1988-2007]>
23Note that odd years generally have more late budgets than even years. This is due to the fact that almost
all states with biennial budgeting pass new two-year budgets in odd years, so more budgets are enacted in odd
years than in even years. Relative to the total number of budgets being enacted, there is no di¤erence between
odd years and even years.
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4 Explanatory variables
This section describes the set of explanatory variables in our empirical analyses. More detailed
descriptions of all variables, including their sources, can be found in table A1 in the appendix.
A key prediction of the model is that a shock to the scal climate (as compared to the
previous year) should lead to a delay in the budget adoption, with the delay being longer, the
greater the shock is. To test this prediction, we include di¤erent measures of changes in the scal
climate in our estimations. Our preferred measure is the change in the state unemployment rate
compared to the previous year. An important advantage of this measure over other candidates
is that unemployment statistics are typically available with a much shorter time lag than,
say, growth rates in state GDP. Thus, the state unemployment rate is likely to reect the
information available to policymakers at the time of budget adoption more accurately than
other measures of the business cycle. Furthermore, Scheppach (2009, p. 1) notes that "the
trough in state revenue generally coincides with the peak in unemployment". Finally, the
change in the state unemployment has the nice property that there is a natural distinction
between positive shocks to the scal climate (decreases) and negative shocks (increases).24 We
also consider an alternative measure that focuses more directly on scal conditions, namely the
revenue schock measure developed in Poterba (1994) and Poterba and Rueben (2001).
As explained above, we expect divided control over the state government to produce longer
and more frequent budget delays. We therefore include a dummy variable that takes the
value one if either i) both chambers in the legislature are controlled by another party than
the governors (split branch), or ii) the two chambers are controlled by di¤erent parties (split
legislature):We shall later look more into the di¤erence between these two types of divided
government.
An additional prediction of the model is that the greater the cost politicians incur during
delays, the shorter is the expected delay. As mentioned in section 2, we expect such costs to be
higher in election years than in non-election years. We also consider measures that plausibly
correlate with the opportunity cost of budget stalemates for the politicians involved: Part-
time legislators often have well-paid civil occupations in addition to their political o¢ ce, and
they typically receive only a modest compensation (and perhaps none at all if the deadline is
exceeded) for spending time at the state assembly. Hence, part-time legislators have a much
greater opportunity cost of delaying agreement than full-time legislators, who have no or limited
outside occupation. We therefore include a variable that characterizes the state legislature on
a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 corresponds to a part time "citizen legislature, while 5 corresponds to
a full-time professional legislature. Our prior is that delays are both longer and more frequent
24No equally natural distinction exists for another potential measure, namely the growth rate in real state
GDP; what constitutes a negative shock in this case? A negative growth rate? A below-average growth rate?
Or a drop in the growth rate relative to last year? In our opinion, there is no obvious answer to this question.
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in full-time legislatures.
In a similar spirit, we also include dummy variables for whether the legislature is required
(by constitution or statute) to end its regular session before a certain deadline. Where such
deadlines are present, a failure to pass the budget before the deadline means that the legis-
lature must go into overtime session, or that a special session must be called. This increases
the salience of budget impasses, and we therefore expect the political costs of proctracted ne-
gotiations to be higher in states that have such deadlines. We distinguish between two types
of legislative session deadlines: Hard deadlines require the regular session to end by a certain,
clearly specied date, with no room for extension. Soft deadlines are deadlines that either do
not specify a certain calendar date by which the regular session must end (for example, the
Georgia constitution limits the regular session to 40 legislative days, but it does not require
these legislative days to be consecutive), or gives the legislature some leeway to extend the
session beyond the deadline (for example, the Arkansas legislature can, and frequently does,
extend its 60-days deadline by a two-thirds vote in both chambers).
Finally, states di¤er widely in the consequences that can arise in the event of a late budget.
To capture some of these di¤erences, we include a dummy for whether entering a new scal
year without a budget in place could lead to a shutdown of state government activities. Unfor-
tunately for our purposes, the reliability of this information is impaired by the fact that many
states have never experienced a late budget, and their state laws do not address the issue. The
true consequences of a late budget are therefore unknown in these states.
In addition to the above categories of variables that test our main predictions, we explore
the impact of a range of institutional, political, cultural and demographic factors: We con-
sider various institutions related to the budget, such as whether there any super majoritarian
requirements for passing the budget (as is the case in California). Balanced budget rules are
another potentially important institution. Conditional on the state of the economy, how much
scal adjustment is needed is likely to depend on the strictness of these rules, but also on the
cash available in the general fund and the stabilization fund, both of which we control for.
We also control for the party a¢ liation of the governor, whether the governor faces a binding
term limit, the length of the governors incumbency, and whether the current budget adoption
process is the rst to be handled by the incumbent governor.
Knack (2002) argues that a range of cultural and demographic variables might inuence
government performance, including the timeliness of the budget. We therefore control for the
e¤ect of the state population size, the proportion of non-working aged people, the proportion
of blacks and the proportion of college graduates in the population. Knack (2002) also docu-
ments that certain types of social capital, such as civic reciprocity, are determinants of good
governance, and so we proxy for this by including the Census 1990 mail response rate as an
explanatory variable.
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Finally, we run all regressions both with and without state xed e¤ects. Unfortunately, some
of the control variables mentioned above are time invariant and must therefore be dropped when
state xed e¤ects are included. Five-year interval time dummies are included to account for
nation-wide trends across time.25
5 Results
5.1 Binary response models
We start out with the simplest of our measures of budget lateness, the binary variable late_budget.
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 2 present results from some basic estimations in which we have only
included our two main explanatory variables of interest: The change in the state unemployment
rate and a dummy variable for divided government. We use a pooled probit estimator as well
as the xed e¤ect logit estimator.26
In columns (1) and (2) we simply include the change in the unemployment rate, without
distinguishing positive changes from negative changes. The change in the unemployment rate
and divided control of the government are both associated with more frequent occurrences of
late budgets. However, these specications impose a linear e¤ect of changes in the unemploy-
ment rate, in the sense that decreases in the unemployment rate are restricted to have the same
impact as increases, but with the sign reversed. Columns (3) and (4) relax this restriction by
explicitly separating positive changes in the unemployment rate from negative changes. More
precisely, the variable unempl_increase is equal to the change in the unemployment rate if
the change is positive, and takes the value zero in all other cases. The variable unempl_drop
is equal to the absolute value of the change in the unemployment rate if the change is negative,
and otherwise zero.27 This reveals an important non-linearity: As expected, increases in the
unemployment rate are associated with higher probabilities of observing budget delays, relative
to a stable unemployment rate. In contrast, a drop in the unemployment rate does not appear
to lower the probability of budget delays. If anything, delays are more likely when the state
unemployment rate drops below the level from the previous year, as our model would predict.
25 In general, we wish to include time dummies to capture heterogeneity across time. But since economic
conditions are highly correlated across states, it may be di¢ cult to disentangle the e¤ect of national trends
from the e¤ect of changes in scal climates. This means that precise estimation of the coe¢ cients on the
unemployment variables may be di¢ cult if we also include yearly time dummies. As a compromise, we therefore
use dummies for 5-year periods to capture national trends, rather than yearly dummy variables. Using yearly
time dummies yields similar coe¢ cient estimates but with substantially higher standard errors on the cyclical
variables.
26The Fixed E¤ect logit can only be estimated for the 20 states that have have some variation in the dependent
variable (not all 0s or 1s).
27With these denitions, the restriction imposed in columns (1) and (2) is that the coe¢ cient on
unempl_increase is equal to minus one times the coe¢ cient on unempl_drop.
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But as the model also predicts, the impact of a drop in the unemployment rate appears to be
weaker than the impact of a similar-sized increase: The coe¢ cients on drops in the unemploy-
ment rate are always smaller than the coe¢ cients on increases, although the di¤erences are not
statistically signicant.
To illustrate the magnitude of the e¤ects, we calculate the marginal e¤ects of the explana-
tory variables in the probit estimations. Columns (3) suggest that, compared to a zero change,
a one percentage-point increase in the state unemployment rate increases the likelihood that
the state budget will not be signed into law before the new scal year by 7.8%-points. The
corresponding number for a one percentage-point drop in the unemployment rate is 6.2%-
points. Compared to a unied government, divided control of the state government raises the
probability of a late budget by 14.8%-points.
<Table 2 about here. [Binary response models, 1988-2007]>
Columns (5) to (7) include a full set of control variables, as described in the previous section.
Adding control variables does not change the main results: Divided government signicantly
increases the probability of a late budget, and so do increases in the unemployment rate. Drops
in the unemployment rate also appear to increase the probability of late budgets. The estimated
e¤ect is signicant on a 5% level when using the pooled probit estimator, but not quite so when
we use the xed e¤ect logit estimator (the p-value is 0:14). The coe¢ cient on unemp_drop is
in all cases smaller than the coe¢ cient on unemp_increase, but the di¤erences are again not
statistically signicant.
Turning to the control variables, we nd no e¤ect of election years in either of the columns,
in contrast to our priors. In column (5) we omit state xed e¤ects to estimate the e¤ect of a
range of time-invariant state characteristics. As expected, we nd a strongly signicant neg-
ative impact of deadlines that limit the length of the legislatures regular session. Somewhat
surprisingly, the results suggest that "soft" deadlines have a stronger impact than "hard" dead-
lines. At a p-value of 0.12, the di¤erence is borderline statistically signicant. Less surprisingly,
the coe¢ cient on shut_down shows that late budgets are less common in states where they
may result in shutdowns of state government activities.28 Also in line with our expectations
is the negative and signicant coe¢ cient on census_reponse_rate, which suggests that late
budgets are indeed less common in states with a high level of social capital. Our results for
super majority requirements (not reported) do not suggest in any way that such requirements
28Although in line with our theoretical priors, we would advise caution in interpreting this particular result:
Many of those states that list shutdown as a likely (or even unavoidable) outcome of a late budget have never
actually experienced a late budget in recent times. While this could of course reect a causal relationship from
budget procedures to outcomes, the causality could also run in the opposite direction. States that have never
experienced late budgets can "a¤ord" to warn of dire consequences in case of a highly hypothetical budget
delay. Experience suggests, however, that once faced with an actual budget stalemate, state governments have
a tendency to soften the rhetoric and be innovative in their e¤orts to avoid very harsh consequences.
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increase the frequency of late budgets. This is a consistent nding throughout our empirical
analyses.29 Finally, in contrast to our priors, the results in column (5) do not provide any
evidence that full-time legislatures are more prone to producing late budgets than part-time
legislatures. This could of course reect that there is in fact no causal e¤ect, but it could
also be caused by a problem of multicollinearity. In particular, full_time_legislature and
population are highly correlated, both individually insignicant, but jointly signicant at a
10% level (p-value of 0.07). In column (6) we therefore leave out population. This produces
the expected positive and signicant coe¢ cient on full_time_legislature.
5.2 Linear regression models
The results in this section exploit the full variation in our measure of budget lateness. This
allows us to study the length of budget stalemates, rather than the frequency. As in the
previous section, we start out with some parsimonious specications. Columns (1) and (2)
in Table 3 report basic xed e¤ects estimations with the change in the unemployment rate
(separated into drops and increases in column (2)) and a dummy for divided government as
the only explanatory variables. The results are in line with those from the previous section:
Divided government is strongly associated with longer budget negotiations. The change in
the unemployment rate, when included in its simplest form, is also positively related to our
measures of budget lateness. But as in the previous section, distinguishing positive changes
from negative changes suggests that the relationship is non-linear: A rise in the unemployment
rate increases the expected length of the budget adoption process, as can be seen from the
positive and signicant coe¢ cient on unempl_increase. The coe¢ cient on unempl_drop,
on the other hand, is imprecisely estimated, and there is no solid evidence that a falling
unemployment rate has any impact on the length of budget negotiations. These results suggest
that economic slowdowns have a greater impact on the duration of budget negotiations than
economic upswings. In terms of magnitude, the estimates indicate that a 1 percentage-point
rise in the unemployment rate postpones nal enactment by about a week.
<Table 3 about here. [Linear regression models, 1988-2007]>
In columns (3) to (5) we include our full set of control variables. This produces even larger
coe¢ cients on unempl_increase. The coe¢ cient is signicant at the 1% level in all columns.
In contrast, the estimated coe¢ cients on unempl_drop are small and statistically insignicant
across all columns. 30 Divided government again has a large and highly signicant e¤ect on the
29We do not elaborate further on this but a full set of estimation results, including estimated coe¢ cients for
super majority requirements, can be obtained from the authors upon request.
30Unlike the results in the previous section, the coe¢ cients on unempl_increase and unempl_drop are
now signicantly di¤erent at a 1% level across all columns. In contrast, the hypothesis that the coe¢ cient
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expected length of the budget process. Compared to a unied government, our results show
that the expected length of the budget process is about two weeks longer (using the xed e¤ect
estimate) when the state government is under divided control.
Unlike in the previous section, we now nd a signicant e¤ect of election years. As expected,
budget negotiations are shorter in election years than in non-election years. The di¤erence
is estimated to be between one and two weeks. The rst budget adoption process under a
new governor appears to nish a little later than in other years. Rookie governors sign the
budget about a week later than governors who have led at least one budget negotiation process,
although the di¤erence is not statistically signicant when state xed e¤ects are included.
Turning to the time-invariant variables, we again nd highly signicant e¤ects of deadlines
that limit the length of the legislative session. State budgets tend to be signed into law 2-3
weeks earlier in states where a delay would trigger a shutdown of non-essential services than in
states where such shutdowns cannot happen. There is some evidence that higher social capital
is associated with shorter delays, but the results are now not signicant. Finally, parallelling
the results from the previous section, we nd a positive but statistically insignicant coe¢ cient
on full_time_leg when we also control for state population size. The coe¢ cient becomes
much bigger and statistically signicant when population is excluded, as shown in column (4).
5.3 Censored models
A potential issue with our dependent variable days_late is the manner in which negative values
are treated. To illustrate, governors usually sign the budget quickly after receiving it from the
legislature. Days_late will then record a negative value if this happens before the end of the
scal year. But some governors sometimes choose to postpone signing the budget until the last
day of the scal year for ceremonial reasons only. In such cases, the postponed enactment is not
due to a budget stalemate, but days_late records a zero, rather than a negative value. Thus,
the variation in days_late that is within the negative domain may just reect unimportant,
idiosyncratic noise.
In order to deal with this issue, we left-censor our dependent variables at zero in this section.
By censoring the data we can view budget negotiations as a process that either leads to a timely
budget or a delay of some (stochastic) duration. Zero or negative values of days_late then
indicate a corner solution outcome, while strictly positive observations reect interior solution
outcomes. In Table 4 we use the Tobit model as well as the Honore (1992) semi-parametric
panel Tobit estimator with xed e¤ects on the left-censored version, days_late_cens; of our
dependent variable.
on unempl_increase is equal to minus one times the coe¢ cient on unempl_drop (the restriction imposed in
column (1)) is now only rejected at the 10% level in column (5).
22
<Table 4 about here. Censored outcomes, 1988-2007>
The results broadly conrm our previous ndings. Starting with the Tobit estimates in
columns (1) and (2), the estimated e¤ect of an increase in the unemployment rate has the
usual positive sign and is signicant at a 5% level. As in the linear regressions, the coe¢ cient
on unempl_drop is negative, but numerically small and statistically insignicant. As usual,
the coe¢ cient estimate on divided_gov is positive and highly signicant. The results for the
time-invariant variables also resemble the results in the previous sections: Legislative session
deadlines reduce the expected duration of budget delays, and so do "shut down" provisions and
higher levels of social capital, as proxied by the Census response rate. As usual, the coe¢ cient
on full_time_legislature is positive but insignicant when population is included, but it
becomes signicant at a 10% level when population is omitted, as shown in column (2). The
coe¢ cient estimates produced by the Tobit xed e¤ect estimator in column (3) have the same
sign as the Tobit estimates, but they generally lack precision. The p-value for unempl_increase
is 0.15.31
5.4 Fiscal institutions and economic uctuations
If uctuations in economic activity cause delays in the adoption of state budgets, then we
should expect scal institutions that inuence policymakersability to smooth such uctuations
to a¤ect the relationship between economic conditions and the occurrence of delays. In this
section we examine the interaction between two such institutions, balanced budget rules and
budget stabillization funds, and the change in the state unemployment rate. Recall the intuition
from our model: A change in the amount of available resources relative to the baseline, whether
positive or negative, increases the stakes in budget negotiations and produces longer delays.
Following this logic, we should expect budget stabilization funds that ease smoothing by forcing
extra saving in good years while providing back-up resources in bad years to alleviate the impact
of economic uctuations.
The case of balanced rules is slightly more complicated. On the one hand, balanced budget
rules may hinder smoothing in bad times and could therefore exacerbate the e¤ect of scal
deteriorations. On the other hand, strict rules may promote scal discipline in good years
and therefore dampen the e¤ect of rising revenues. All states except Vermont have some kind
of balanced budget requirement, but the strictness of these requirements varies considerably.
Below we consider two variables that have been used in the literature to characterize the
31The estimated coe¢ cient on divided_gov is insignicant in column (3). However, if we distinguish split-
branch governments from split-legislature governments - an issue that we address further in the next section -
we nd a signicant e¤ect of split legislatures, and a considerably smaller and statistically insignicant e¤ect of
split-branch governments.
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strictness of balanced budget rules: Whether the state is allowed to carry over a decit into
the next scal year, and whether the governor has line-item veto power over the budget. 32
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 we split our sample between "carry-over" states and
"no carry-over" states and estimate the probability of having a late budget using the FE logit
estimator. A rising unemployment rate has a signicant e¤ect on the probability of late budget
in states that have a "No carry-over" provision in place, whereas there is no such e¤ect in
states that allow decits to be carried over. In column (3) we use days_late as the dependent
variable. Rather than splitting the sample, we instead interact a dummy for "no carry-over"
with the unemployment variables unempl_increase and unempl_drop. The results from this
approach do not provide support for the results in columns (1) and (2), since the coe¢ cients
on the interaction terms are insignicant and have the wrong signs. In conclusion, we nd only
weak evidence that a "no carry-over" provision exacerbates the e¤ect of scal deteriorations. In
column (4) we interact the unemployment variables with a dummy for governor line-item veto
power. This produces a large and signicant coe¢ cient on unemp_fall, but a signicant and
even larger negative coe¢ cient on the associated interaction term. Our interpretation of these
results is that the inux of revenue that follows a drop in unemployment intensies the conict
over the budget, as our model predicts, but that governors equipped with line-item veto power
can curb the spending pressure that the extra revenue generates, thereby neutralizing its e¤ect
on the conict level and the length of the budget negotiations.
Columns (5) through (7) in Table 5 focus on the impact of budget stabilization funds.
stab_fundi;t is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the state had a stabilization fund in
year t. In column (5) we interact this variable with unempl_increase and unempl_drop. The
results suggest a remarkable e¤ect of budget stabilization funds. In the absence of a stabilization
fund, a drop in the unemployment rate has a strong positive impact on the expected duration
of a late budget. When present, budget stabilization funds appear to neutralize this e¤ect. On
the other hand, the results in column (5) do not suggest that the introduction of stabilization
funds has done anything to alleviate the impact of rising unemployment rates on the length of
budget negotiations.
Columns (6) and (7) investigate how the impact of a stabilization fund depends on the
specic rules that govern deposits into- and withdrawals from the fund. Wagner and Elder
(2005) characterize the strictness of deposit and withdrawal rules on a 1 to 4 scale, where
higher values correspond to less discretion and stricter rules. For both deposit and withdrawal
rules, we create dummy variables for each of the four steps on the scale. We then interact
our unemployment variables with stab_fundi;t and with each of these dummies. Column (6)
focuses on deposit rules, while column (7) does the same for withdrawal rules. The results
show that the negative coe¢ cient on the interaction between unempl_drop and stab_fundi;t
32See for example Alt and Lowry (1994), Bohn and Inman (1996) or Fatás and Mihov (2006).
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found in column (5) is mainly driven by states in the upper categories on Wagner and Elders
scale. In particular, stabilization funds are e¤ective in states where deposits into the fund
are required in the event of a budget surplus (depos_rule2 = 1) or given by a mathemat-
ical formula (depos_rule4 = 1), and where withdrawals from the fund are only allowed in
the event of a budget decit (withdraw_rule2 = 1) or a supermajority legislative approval
(withdraw_rule3 = 1). Budget stabilization funds appear to be least e¤ective at preventing
budget delays in states where deposits and withdrawals are made by legislative appropriation
(depos_rule1 = 1 and withdraw_rule1 = 1).
<Table 5 about here. [Economic conditions and scal rules, 1988-2007]>
5.5 Alternative indicators of scal conditions and divided government
Table 6 investigates our main results in greater depth. First, we use the revenue shock variable
constructed by Poterba (1994) and Poterba and Rueben (2001) as an alternative indicator
of changes in state scal conditions. Poterba and Rueben measure revenue shocks as the
percentage deviation of actual general fund revenues from original projections, with a correction
for the impact of tax changes enacted during the scal year. Their variable thus captures any
unforeseen developments in general fund revenue collections since the enactment of the previous
budget. Following our usual strategy, we let positive shocks and negative shocks (measured in
absolute values) enter separately. The results broadly conrm our previous ndings: Negative
revenue shocks raise the probability of a late budget signicantly, judging from the probit
estimates in column (1). The xed e¤ects regression in column (2) produces a positive but
marginally insignicant coe¢ cient on negative revenue shocks (p-value of 0.107). For positive
shocks, we get a positive and weakly signicant coe¢ cient in the probit estimation in column
(1), but an insignicant coe¢ cient in the other columns.
Second, columns (5)-(8) take a closer look at our divided government variable. Here we
distinguish situations in which the governor faces a united legislature controlled by the op-
posite party (split branch) from situations in which the two chambers in the legislature are
controlled by di¤erent parties (split legislature). Across all columns, we nd an economically
and statistically strong e¤ect of split legislatures. In comparison, the estimated e¤ect of split
branch governments is smaller across all columns and statistically signicant in only two out
of four columns. 33These results suggest that partisan conicts within state legislatures play a
more prominent role in the explanation of budget stalemates than do conicts between di¤erent
branches of state government.
33We also tried interacting the divided government variables with a measure of political polarization, but none
of the interaction terms came out signicant and were therefore omitted.
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<Table 6 about here. [Robustness of economic indicators and divided government, 1988-2007]>
6 Concluding remarks
The government budget is the legal basis for government spending and a prime venue for
political conict. Occasionally, this leads to prolonged budget negotiations, beyond both state
specic deadlines and the beginning of the scal year. We have collected and systematized data
on budget negotiation durations for US state governments for the period 1988-2007. We use this
data to test a war-of-attrition model of bargaining between politicians from di¤erent branches of
government; the politicians are loss averse with respect to deviations from budgetary baselines
as references points, and the model generates a number of testable hypotheses that we take to
the budget negotiation data.
Our main empirical conclusions support the hypotheses of the model: increasing unemploy-
ment leads to a longer budget negotiation process, it increases the risk of exceeding budget
deadlines and it prolongs periods with no budget in place. Falling unemployment also weakly
increases the risk of seeing a late budget, in accordance with our models predictions, but in
contrast to widely held beliefs that more funds automatically make agreeing on a budget easier.
Divided government makes late budgets more likely in all cases. In addition, higher political
costs, present in election years, decrease the duration of late budgets, while higher personal
costs, for non-professional legislators, decrease both the risk of late budgets as well as their
duration. Soft or hard deadlines that require the legislature to end its regular session before
the end of the scal year limit the occurence of late budgets.
While the e¤ects of balanced budget institutions are somewhat weak, gubernatorial line-
item veto powers limit negotiations during good times as do stabilization funds with strict
deposit rules. The results for withdrawals from stabilization funds in times of increasing un-
employment are less clear cut, possibly owing to our lack of controlling for whether funds are
actually present to be withdrawn; in the most recent episode of late budgets, several states
entered hard times with very low levels of rainy-day savings. Finally, using late budgets as
a measure of good governance, higher social capital does seem to be associated with better
governance, conrming the ndings of Putnam (1993) and Knack (2002).
Finally, why do some states never experience late budgets? Our results suggest that gov-
ernment shutdown provisions and the use of soft or hard deadlines that limit the length of
the regular session are important determinants of the presences of late budgets. In contrast,
super-majority requirements, often mentioned as a contributing factor to the late budgets of
California, do not show up signicantly in our results. However, California have no soft or
hard deadlines for ending the regular session of the legislature and no government shutdown
provisions, which suggests that there are many institutional possibilities available to reformers
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of the California budget process and across governments.34
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7 Appendix
7.1 The symmetric Nash Equilibrium
This part of the appendix shows that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the
war of attrition model studied in the main text. We continue in two steps.
The rst step is to realize that in any symmetric equilibrium, the playerschosen concession
times must be a strictly decreasing function of their respective marginal costs of delay.
Lemma 1 Let (T (A); T (B)) be a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the war of attri-
tion game studied in section 2, where T : (; ] ! [0;1) is a di¤erentiable function. T must
then satisfy T 0(i) < 0.
Proof. 35Let EU(Ti; i) denote the expected utility for a player with marginal cost i who
chooses concession time Ti. Further, let T (0i) and T (
00
i ) denote the chosen concession times of
players with marginal costs 0i and 
00
i , respectively. Equilibrium then requires that
EU(T (0i); 
0
i)  EU(T (00i ); 0i)
and
EU(T (00i ); 
00
i )  EU(T (0i); 00i )
Adding these two inequalities and rearranging yields
EU(T (0i); 
0
i)  EU(T (0i); 00i )  EU(T (00i ); 0i)  EU(T (00i ); 00i ) (A1)
By equations 3, 4 and 6, EU(Ti; i) is given by
EU(Ti; i) = (1 H(Ti))(uL   iTi) +H(Ti)uW  
TiZ
0
t  h(t)dt
Substituting this into the inequality in A1 then gives, after some rearranging,
(00i   0i)

G(T (0i)) G(T (00i ))
  0 (A2)
where
G(x)  (1 H(x))x+
xZ
0
t  h(t)dt
35This proof draws heavily on Example 6.3 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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Notice now that G0(x) =  h(x)x + 1   H(x) + xh(x) = 1   H(x)  0. Combined with the
inequality in A2, this means that if 0i < 
00
i , then we must have T (
0
i)  T (00i ), so T 0(i)  0.
To see that equilibrium concession times must be strictly decreasing in the marginal cost
of delay, consider the following argument: If T were not strictly decreasing, there would exist
some closed interval X  (; ] and some t  0, such that T (j) = t for all j 2 X. This would
then imply that prob(T (j) = t) > 0. Consider now a player i with i 2 X: Symmetry would
require this player to set Ti = T (i) = t. However, given that prob(T (j) = t) > 0, player i
would never choose Ti = t. She would do better setting Ti just above t, because this would
increase the probability of winning "discontinuously", while only increasing the cost from delay
innitesimally. Hence, T (i) would not be a best response to itself, so (T (A); T (B)) could
not be a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The next step uses Lemma 1 to prove existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let T : (; ] ! [0;1) be a di¤erentiable function. (T (A); T (B)) is a sym-
metric Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if T (i) satises
T 0(i) =  

uW   uL i(i   ) 1 for all i 2 (; ] (A3)
and
T () = 0 (A4)
Proof. We show the "only if" part of the proof rst, since the "if" part then follows
straightforwardly afterwards.
"Only if ":
If (TA; TB) = (T (A); T (B)) is a Nash equilibrium, it must satisfy for i; j = A;B ; i 6= j:
EU(T (i); i)  EU( ~T ; i) for all ~T  0 and for all i 2 (; ], given Tj = T (j)
Any interior solution to the utility maximazation problem must satisfy the rst-order condition
dEU(T (i))
dTi
= 0. That is, if T (i) > 0, the derivative of expected utility with respect to Ti must
be zero at Ti = T (i).
Now recall that
dEU(Ti; i)
dTi
= (uW   uL)h(Ti)  (1 H(Ti))i (A5)
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where H is the cdf of Tj , the opponents concession time, and h is the associated density
function. Let T 1(Ti) be the inverse to T , so that T 1(T (i)) = i. T 1 is then dened on the
interval [T (); lim! T ()). Use that Tj = T (j). For Ti 2 [T (); lim! T ()) we can then
write H(Ti) as
H(Ti) = prob(T (j) < Ti) = prob(j > T
 1(Ti)) = 1  T
 1(Ti)  
    (A6)
while H(Ti) = 0 for Ti < T () and H(Ti) = 1 for Ti  lim! T (). In this derivation of
H(Ti), we have used that T 0() < 0, and the fact that j is uniformly distributed on (; ].
Di¤erentiating with respect to Ti then gives us that for Ti 2 [T (); lim! T ()):
h(Ti) =   1
   
1
T 0(T 1(Ti))
(A7)
while h(Ti) = 0 for all other Ti. Inserting (A6) and (A7) into (A5) and evaluating at Ti = T (i)
then gives
dEU(T (i))
dTi
=  (uW   uL) 1
   
1
T 0(i)
  i   
    i = 0,
T 0(i) =  (uW   uL)(i(i   )) 1 (A8)
To summarize, we have now established that if (T (A); T (B)) is a Nash equilibrium, it must
be the case for all i 2 (; ] that T (i) > 0 ) T 0(i) =  (uW   uL)(i(i   )) 1. Note now
that we must have T (i) > 0 for all i 2 (; ): This follows from T 0(i) < 0 and and the
requirement T (i)  0 for all i 2 (; ]. Combined with the result above, this implies that
T (i) must satisfy equation (A3).
The last step is now to prove the boundary condition T () = 0. To do this, let T0(i) denote
the function that satises equation (A3) and T0() = 0. Consider then another function T1(i)
that satises (A3) with T1() > 0. We can then write this function as T1(i) = T0(i) + T1().
Assume that the opponent plays according to Tj = T1(j); and imagine now the choice problem
facing a player i with i = : If he plays according to Ti = T1(i), it means that he will be
waiting T1() time units before conceding. Since there is zero probability that the opponent
will concede in this time interval, this implies a certain utility loss of iT1(), with no chance
of winning the battle over the budget. Clearly, it would then be better for player i to concede
immediately and avoid the costs of the delay. Thus, T1(i) is not a best reply to itself for all
possible values of i, and so it cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
"If ":
Assume that player j chooses Tj = T (j), where T satises (A3) and (A4). Integrating
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equation (A3) over i and using (A4) to solve for the additive constant then gives
T (i) = [u
W   uL]1


ln

i
i   

  ln


   

from which it is clear that T () = 0 and lim! T () = 1. The inverse function T 1(Ti) is
therefore dened for all Ti  0, so from (A6) and (A7) we get that for all Ti  0:
H(Ti) = 1  T
 1(Ti)  
    ; h(Ti) =  
1
   
1
T 0(T 1(Ti))
Now use that T 0(T 1(Ti)) 1 =  [uW   uL] 1(T 1(Ti)(T 1(Ti)  )) 1 to get
h(Ti) =
1
   
T 1(Ti)(T 1(Ti)  )
[uW   uL]
The rst-order condition for player i then becomes
1
   T
 1(Ti)(T 1(Ti)  ) = T
 1(Ti)  
    i ,
T 1(Ti) = i ()
Ti = T (i)
To nd the second-order derivative, note that
h0(Ti) =
1
   
(2T 1(Ti)  )
[uW   uL]
1
T 0(T 1(Ti))
=  (2T
 1(Ti)  )
[uW   uL] h(Ti)
so the second-order derivative is
d2EUi(Ti)
dT 2i
= [uW   uL]h0(Ti) + h(Ti)i
= ( 2T 1(Ti) +  + i)h(Ti)
Now use the result from the rst-order condition that T 1(Ti) = i to get:
d2EUi(Ti)
dT 2i
jTi=T (i) =  (i   )h(Ti) < 0
Hence, marginal utility is zero at Ti = T (i), and the second-order derivative is negative at
this point. This shows that Ti = T (i) is a local utility maximum point. Further, since there
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are no other extremum points, dEU(Ti)=dTi must be positive for all Ti < T (i) and negative
for all Ti > T (i). It then follows that Ti = T (i) is also a global maximum point. Hence, T ()
is a best response to itself, so (TA; TB) = (T (A); T (B)) is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
7.2 Proof of equation 12
Let A(t) be the cumulative distribution function for T agree. We can then derive A(t) by noting
that
A(t) = prob(T agree < t) = 1  prob(T (A) > t)  prob(T (B) > t)
= 1  prob(A < T 1(t))  prob(B < T 1(t))
= 1 

T 1(t)  
   
2
where we have used that A and B are independent and both uniformly distributed on (; ].
Let a(t) denote the associated density function of T agree. We then get that the expected time
of budget agreement is
ET agree =
lim! T ()Z
T ()
t  a(t)dt
=
lim! T ()Z
T ()
  2t  (T 1(t)  )  (   ) 2 T 0(T 1(t)) 1 dt
=
Z

2T ()  (   )(   ) 2d
=
[uW   uL]
(   )2
Z

2 ln

(   )
(   )

(   )d
=
[uW   uL]
(   )2

(2   2) ln((   ))  (   )2 ln((   )) + 

= [uW   uL]
 
      ln()  ln()  
   2
!
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where we have used the substitution t = T () to change variables in the integration.36 Substi-
tuting in for [uW   uL] from equation (5) then gives equation (12).
36For the last equation, we have used lHôpitals rule by noting that (   )2 ln((   )) = ln((   ))=((  
) 2), so
lim
!

(   )2 ln((   )) = lim
!

(   ) 1=( 2(   ) 3) = lim
!

  
2
(   )2

= 0
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7.3 Figures and tables
Figure 1: No. of days from end of scal year to nal budget enactment, 1988-2007
Figure 2: The number of late budgets over time, 48 states
36
Figure 3: No. of budgets enacted after beginning of scal year relative to total
no. of enacted budgets, 1988-2007
Figure 4: No. of budgets passed after legislatures deadline relative to total
no. of enacted budgets 1988-2007
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Table 1. Summary statistics(1)
Variable Obs(2) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
late_budget 736 0.23 0.42 0 1
days_late 734 ‐29.86 49.99 ‐172 176
days_late_cens 734 6.92 21.45 0 176
delayed_budget 720 0.26 0.44 0 1
days_delayed 720 ‐9.97 43.19 ‐115 175
days_delayed_cens 720 9.63 24.18 0 175
delayed_budget_FY 720 0.17 0.37 0 1
days_delayed_FY 720 ‐42.60 52.07 ‐178 175
days_delayed_cens_FY 720 5.26 19.14 0 175
Notes: 
(1) The total number of observations may vary betwen the different forms of the dependent variable. This is due to a few cases where we know 
that the budget was signed into law after the beginning of the new fiscal year, but where we do not know the exact date on which this 
happened. 
(2) The total number of enacted budgets in the period 1988 to 2007 is 808.
38
Table 2. Binary response models, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.117 0.335*
(0.090) (0.181)
0 560*** 0 963*** 0 494** 0 487** 0 901**
Budget signed into law after end of fiscal year
,i tElex
iFull time legislature_ _
iShut down_
iCensus response rate_ _
i tDivided gov ,_
i tUnempl drop ,_
i tUnempl increase ,_
i tUnempl change ,_
iDeadline soft_
i tDeadline hard ,_
i tPopulation ,
. . . . .
(0.140) (0.323) (0.218) (0.220) (0.403)
0.446** 0.558 0.334** 0.333** 0.770
(0.187) (0.430) (0.162) (0.163) (0.519)
0.656*** 0.957*** 0.685*** 1.026*** 0.635*** 0.616*** 0.846**
(0.184) (0.332) (0.178) (0.334) (0.188) (0.190) (0.369)
‐0.121 ‐0.116 0.031
(0.178) (0.177) (0.397)
0.011 ‐0.339
(0.029) (0.327)
0.130 0.175*
(0.170) (0.092)
‐1.185*** ‐1.174***
(0 287) (0 299). .
‐0.079** ‐0.081**
(0.036) (0.036)
‐2.829*** ‐2.768***
(0.678) (0.628)
‐1.756*** ‐1.755***
(0.285) (0.291)
Estimator Pooled 
probit
FE logit Pooled 
probit
FE logit Pooled 
probit
Pooled 
probit
FE logit
Time dummies No No No No 5‐Year 5‐Year 5‐Year
Control variables No No No No Yes Yes Yes
P[y=1|div. gov.] ‐ P[y=1|uni. gov.] (5), (8) 18.6% Na 14.8% Na 24.5% 23.9% Na
Marginal effect of ΔUNR > 0  (6), (8) 2.4% Na 7.8% Na 19.6% 19.3% Na
Marginal effect of ΔUNR < 0  (7), (8) ‐2.4% Na 6.2% Na 13.2% 13.1% Na
Observations 732 320 732 320 732 732 320
Notes: 
(1) Std. errors in parantheses. Cluster std. errors are used in the pooled probit estimations
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(3) A constant is included in all estimations.
(5) R t th i i th b bilit f l t b d t h th i di id d t i t d f ifi d t
(4) Also included in columns (5), (6) and (7) are: endbalance, kids and aged as well as dem_gov, term_limited, new_gov and gov_experience. Columns (5) and (6) also 
includes the following time‐invariant variables: No_carry, supermajority, proportion_black and proportion_college. 
  epor s  e  ncrease  n  e pro a y o  a  a e  u ge  w en  ere  s  v e  governmen   ns ea  o  un e  governmen
(6) Reports the impact on the probability of a late budget of a marginal increase in the state unemployment rate
(7) Reports the impact on the probability of a late budget of a marginal drop in the state unemployment rate
(8) All marginal effects on P[y=1] are evaluated at a unified government and  a zero change in the unemployment rate. The additional controls in columns (5), (6) and (7) 
are evaluated at their averages except for the dummies for election, democratic gov., lame duck, new governor, No_carry, super majority rule, shut down provision and 
deadlines, which are set to zero.
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Table 3. Linear regression models, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5.152***
(1.695)
6.932*** 10.818*** 10.629*** 8.763***
(2.454) (3.244) (3.247) (2.544)
‐2.898 ‐1.606 ‐2.41 ‐0.264
(3.575) (3.856) (3.812) (3.251)
12.791*** 12.857*** 24.452*** 22.594*** 13.511***
(3.347) (3.331) (4.099) (4.014) (3.600)
‐13.050*** ‐12.807*** ‐8.532***
(3.126) (3.166) (2.726)
8.444** 7.757* 5.157
(4.016) (4.040) (3.779)
1.292* 0.826
(0.749) (1.515)  
0.485 4.713*
(4.047) (2.711)
‐18.650** ‐17.798**
(7.638) (7.879)
‐1.079 ‐1.247
(0.908) (0.897)
‐39.090*** ‐35.899***
(12.884) (13.357)
*** ***
No. of days from end of fiscal year to signed into law
,i tElex
iFull time legislature_ _
iShut down_
iCensus response rate_ _
i tDivided gov ,_
i tUnempl drop ,_
i tUnempl increase ,_
i tUnempl change ,_
i tNew gov ,_
i tPopulation ,
iDeadline soft_
i tDeadline hard ,_ ‐44.441 ‐43.819
(9.173) (9.614)
Estimator FE FE OLS OLS FE
Time dummies No No 5‐Year 5‐Year 5‐Year
Control variables No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 730 730 730 730 730
Notes: 
(1) Robust std. errors in parantheses. Cluster std. errors are used in the OLS estimations
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(3) A constant is included in all estimations.
(4) Also included in columns (3), (4) and (5) are: endbalance, kids and aged as well as dem_gov, term_limited and gov_experience. Columns (3) and 
(4) also includes the following time‐invariant variables: No_carry, supermajority, proportion_black and proportion_college. 
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Table 4. Censored outcomes, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3)
13.446** 13.472** 10.629
(5.703) (5.706) (7.404)
‐3.232 ‐3.255 ‐24.578
(6.563) (6.565) (22.818)
18.654*** 18.415*** 23.922
(6.028) (5.986) (19.068)
‐9.276 ‐9.21 ‐19.943**
(6.083) (6.084) (7.956)
0.348 ‐2.831
(1.139) (3.396)
7.671 9.119*
(6.831) (5.006)
‐42.661*** ‐42.630***
(13.101) (13.217)
‐2.405* ‐2.506**
(1.266) (1.236)
‐83.084*** ‐81.843***
(21.197) (20.810)
‐51.559*** ‐51.456***
(11.236) (11.283)
Estimator Tobit Tobit Panel Tobit
Time dummies 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year
Controls variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 730 730 730
Censored no. of days from end of fiscal 
year to signed into law
i tDivided Gov ,_
iShut down_
iFull time legislature_ _
iCensus response rate_ _
i tUnempl drop ,_
i tUnempl increase ,_
i tPopulation ,
iDeadline soft_
i tDeadline hard ,_
i tElex ,
Notes: 
(1) Std. errors in paranthesis.
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(3) A constant is included in all estimations.
(4) Also included are: endbalance, kids and aged as well as dem_gov, term_limited, new_gov and 
gov_experience. Columns (1) and (2) also includes the following time‐invariant variables: No_carry, 
supermajority, proportion_black and proportion_college. 
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Table 5. Economic Fluctuations and Fiscal Rules, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(4) (7)(5)
0.788 1.422* 8.786** 11.312** 11.108 10.612 10.828
(0.596) (0.735) (3.896) (5.258) (10.004) (9.729) (9.808)
1.002 0.451 ‐4.845 13.336** 17.631** 17.664** 18.462**
(0.698) (0.961) (6.258) (6.480) (7.309) (6.985) (6.891)
0.926* 0.891 13.425*** 13.642*** 13.652*** 13.542*** 13.815***
(0.488) (0.722) (3.634) (3.616) (3.530) (3.524) (3.538)
‐0.064
(4.689)
9.174
(7.405)
‐3.021
(5.626)
‐15.356**
(7.540)
7.778 8.089 7.964
(8.395) (7.940) (7.914)
‐3.071
(11.068)
‐21.491**
(9.070)
‐4.314 0.615
(10.811) (11.771)
0.061 ‐9.115
(11.359) (10.508)
Budget signed into law after 
end of fiscal year
No. of days from end of fiscal year to signed into law
i tDivided gov ,_
i tUnempl drop ,_
i tUnempl increase ,_
i t iUnempl increase no carry,_ _×
i t iUnempl drop no carry,_ _×
i t i tUnempl increase stab fund, ,_ _×
i t i tUnempl drop stab fund, ,_ _×
i tUnempl drop J rule,_ _ 1×
i tUnempl drop J rule,_ _ 2×
i tUnempl drop J rule,_ _ 3×
i tUnempl drop J rule,_ _ 4×
i tUnempl increase J rule,_ _ 1×
i tUnempl increase J rule,_ _ 2×
i tUnempl increase J rule,_ _ 3×
i tUnempl increase J rule,_ _ 4×
i t iUnempl increase line item veto,_ _ _×
i t iUnempl increase line item veto,_ _ _×
i tStab fund ,_
‐4.039 ‐0.286
(11.424) (14.419)
‐9.588 0.794
(12.631) (10.476)
‐12.412 ‐17.061*
(7.890) (9.143)
‐22.599** ‐22.426**
(10.020) (9.056)
‐11.182 ‐40.662***
(9.578) (11.412)
‐34.356** ‐32.203
(14.706) (21.866)
Estimator FE logit FE logit FE FE FE FE FE
Time dummies 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample
Carry‐over states No carry‐over 
states Full Full Full Full Full
Observations 173 147 730 730 730 730 730
Number of States  11 9 48 48 48 48 48
Notes: 
(1) Std. errors in paranthesis. Robust std. errors are used in columns (3) ‐ (7)
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively. 
(3) A constant is included in all estimations.
(5) J=Deposit 
(6) J=Withdraw
(4) Same control variables included as in standard fixed effect specification
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Table 6. Alternative indicators of fiscal conditions and divided government, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.180*** 0.616 1.306* 0.956
(0.058) (0.375) (0.672) (0.865)
0.053* ‐0.078 0.471 0.452
(0.030) (0.134) (0.381) (0.489)
0.887** 8.523*** 12.614** 9.931
(0.398) (2.655) (5.683) (6.998)
0.783 ‐0.421 ‐4.116 ‐25.469
(0.526) (3.180) (6.565) (23.044)
0.783** 13.529*** 18.535*** 23.946
(0.377) (3.579) (6.110) (20.255)
0.66 12.190*** 11.891* 12.133
(0.428) (4.253) (6.945) (21.413)
1.204*** 14.251*** 22.923*** 27.864*
(0.448) (3.797) (6.987) (15.455)
Estimator FE logit FE Tobit Panel Tobit FE logit FE Tobit Panel Tobit
Time dummies 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year
Days_late_censLate_budget   Days_late Days_late_cens Late_budget   Days_late
i tRev_shock_neg ,
i tRev_shock_pos ,
i tSplit branch ,_
i tSplit legislature ,_
i tUnemp increase ,_
i tUnemp drop ,_
i tDivided gov ,_
  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 319 727 727 727 320 730 730 730
Notes: 
(1) Std. errors in parantheses.  Robust Std. errors in column (2) and (6)
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(3) A constant is included in all estimations.
(4) Same control variables as in standard specification included in all columns.
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Table A1. Late budgets data by state
Information on late budget 
available for (1)
Responded to survey Number of late 
budgets observed
Alabama 1989, 1991‐2007 No 0
Alaska ‐ ‐ ‐
Arizona 1988‐90 , 1991‐2007 Yes 1
Arkansas 1988‐2007 No 0
California 1988‐2007 Yes 16
Colorado 1988‐89, 1991, 1993‐2007 No 0
Connecticut 1988‐2007 Yes 3
Delaware 1992‐2007 No 11
Florida 1988‐2007 Yes 1
Georgia 1988‐92, 1993 , 1994‐2007 Yes 0
Hawaii ‐ ‐ ‐
Idaho 1988‐97 , 1998‐2007 Yes 0
Illinois 1988‐2007 Yes 10
Indiana 1988‐2007 No 0
Iowa 1992‐2007 No 0
Kansas 1989‐91, 1993, 1997‐2007 No 0
Kentucky 1988‐2007 No 0
Louisiana 1988‐2007 No 17
Maine 1991‐2007 Yes 1
Maryland 1991‐2007 No 0
Massachusetts 1988‐2007 Yes 15
Michigan 1988‐98, 1991, 1995‐2007 No 5
Minnesota 1988‐2007 No 1
Mississippi 1997‐2007 Yes 0
Missouri 1988‐2007 No 0
Montana 1999‐2007 No 0
Nebraska 1997‐2007 No 0
Nevada 1991‐2007 No 2
New Hampshire 1991‐2007 No 3
New Jersey 1988‐2007 No 5
New Mexico 1988‐94 , 1995‐2007 Yes 0
New York 1988‐2007 No 20
North Carolina 1988‐2007 No 17
North Dakota 1988‐2007 Yes 0
Ohio 1988‐2007 No 3
Oklahoma 1993‐2007 No 0
Oregon 1988‐90, 1992‐2007 No 8
Pennsylvania 1988‐2007 Yes 9
Rhode Island 1988‐2000 , 2001‐2007 Yes 7
South Carolina 1988‐2007 Yes 0
South Dakota 1996‐2007 No 0
Tennessee 1995‐2007 No 0
Texas 1988‐2007 No 0
Utah 1989‐2007 No 0
Vermont 1988‐2007 No 0
Virginia 1988‐2007 Yes 0
Washington 1988‐2007 Yes 0
West Virginia 1988‐92 , 1993‐2007 Yes 0
Wisconsin 1988‐2007 Yes 10
Wyoming 1998‐2007 No 0
Notes: 
(1) Normal font indicates that authors' own data collection is the only source of information. Italics indicate that the survey sent to state budget 
offices is the only source of information. Bold indicates that information is available from both sources. 
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Table A2. Variable definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
days_late i,t Number of days from end of fiscal year to budget signed into law Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
days_delayed i,t Number of days from legislative deadline to legislative budget 
passage
Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
days_delayed_FY i,t Number of days from end of fiscal year to legislative budget 
passage
Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
late_budget i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if budget was signed into law after end 
of fiscal year
Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
delayed_budget i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if budget was passed by legislature 
after legislative deadline
Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
delayed_FY_budget i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if budget was passed by legislature 
after end of fiscal year
Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
days_late_cens i,t  = days_late i,t  if days_late i,t  > 0, otherwise zero Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
days_delayed_cens i,t  = days_delayed i,t  if days_delayed i,t  > 0, otherwise zero Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
days_delayed_FY_cens i,t  = days_delayed_FY i,t  if days_delayed_FY i,t  > 0, otherwise zero Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
Unempl_change i,t Change in unemployment rate since previous year Bureau of Labor Statistics
Unempl_increase i,t  = Unempl_change i,t  if Unempl_change i,t  > 0, otherwise zero Bureau of Labor Statistics
Unempl_fall i,t  = ‐1 x Unempl_change i,t  if Unempl_change i,t  < 0, otherwise zero Bureau of Labor Statistics
Divided_gov i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if either  i)  both legislative chambers 
controlled by other party than governor's, or ii)  two chambers 
controlled by different parties 
http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/jo
urnal_datasets/klarner.shtml
Elex i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 in years with a gubernatorial election Book of the States, various 
editions.
Population i,t State population (in millions of people) U.S. Census Bureau
Full_time_legislature i 1 to 5 scale for full‐ vs. part‐time legislatures, where 1 corresponds 
to a part‐time "citizen" legislature, and 5 corresponds to a full‐
time professional legislature 
National Conference of State 
Legislatures
Shut_down i Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state law dictates a shutdown of 
state government activities in the event of a late budget
National Conference of State 
Legislatures
Census_response_rate i Response rate in the 1990 U.S. Census U.S. Census Bureau
Deadline_soft i Dummy variable equal to 1 if 1) the legislature is mandated by 
constitution or statute to end its regular session at a date prior to 
the end of the fiscal year, and 2) the deadline is  either  not clearly 
specified in calendar terms or the legislature has leeway to extend 
it.
State legislatures' websites
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Table A2. Variable definitions and sources (continued)
Deadline_hard i Dummy variable equal to 1 if 1) the legislature is mandated by 
constitution or statute to end its regular session at a date prior to 
the end of the fiscal year, and 2) the deadline is clearly specified in 
calendar terms and  the legislature has no leeway to extend it.
State legislatures' websites
Endbalance i,t End‐of‐year balances in the general fund and stabilization fund, as 
projected in executive budget proposal. Measured in percent of 
proposed general fund expenditure
National Association of State 
Budget Officers: The Fiscal 
Survey of States , various 
editions
Kids i,t Percentage of population aged 5 to 17 U.S. Census Bureau
Aged i,t Percentage of population aged 65 or older U.S. Census Bureau
Dem_gov i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the governor is a Democrat http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/jo
urnal_datasets/klarner.shtml
Gov_experience i,t Number of years since the incumbent governor took office Authors' own calculations based 
on information from the 
National Governors Association
New_gov i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the the current budget adoption 
process is the first to be led by the incumbent governor
Authors' own calculations based 
on information from the c
Term_limited i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the governor is subject to a binding 
term limit
National Governors Association
No_carry i Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state law does not allow a 
budget deficit to be carried over to the next fiscal year 
Bohn and Inman (1996)
Line_item_veto i Dummy variable equal to 1 if the the governor has line item veto 
powers
Bohn and Inman (1996)
Supermajority i Dummy variable equal to 1 if a supermajority vote is required to 
pass each budget
National Conference of State 
Legislatures
Proportion_black i Average proportion of black people in the population in the period 
1978 to 1997
U.S. Census Bureau
Proportion_college i Average proportion of college graduates in the population in the 
period 1990 to 1999
U.S. Census Bureau
Rev_shock i,t Percentage deviation of actual general fund revenue from original 
projections, net of the effect of within‐year tax changes
Data provided by Kim Rueben. 
See Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Rev_shock_neg i,t  = ‐1 x Rev_shock i,t  if Rev_shock i,t  < 0, otherwise zero Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Rev_shock_neg i,t  =  Rev_shock i,t  if Rev_shock i,t  > 0, otherwise zero Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Split_branch i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if both legislative chambers are 
controlled by another party than the governor's 
http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/jo
urnal_datasets/klarner.shtml
Split_legislature i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the two legislative chambers are 
controlled by different parties 
http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/jo
urnal_datasets/klarner.shtml
Stab_fund i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state has a budget stabilization 
fund in year t
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Deposit_rule1 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if deposits into stabilization fund are 
made by legislative appropriation
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
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Table A2. Variable definitions and sources (continued)
Deposit_rule2 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if deposits into stabilization fund are 
required in the event of a budget surplus
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Deposit_rule3 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if deposits into stabilization fund are 
required when revenue growth is positive
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Deposit_rule4 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if deposits into stabilization fund 
follow a mathematical formula
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Withdraw_rule1 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if withdrawals from stabilization fund 
are made by legislative appropriation
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Withdraw_rule2 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if withdrawals from stabilization fund 
are allowed in the event of a budget deficit
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Withdraw_rule3 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if withdrawals from stabilization fund 
require a supermajority legislative approval
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Withdraw_rule4 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if withdrawals from stabilization fund 
follow a mathematical formula
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
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Table A3. Alternative late budget definitions, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.612* 10.794*** 16.454** 22.235*** 0.453 10.255*** 13.468* 9.557
(0.338) (2.528) (6.563) (7.102) (0.398) (2.597) (7.212) (10.698)
0.307 1.562 ‐1.009 ‐13.414 0.903** 0.941 0.299 ‐48.421**
(0.396) (2.642) (8.419) (13.034) (0.450) (3.446) (8.806) (22.390)
1.214*** 13.471*** 36.980*** 43.227*** 1.258*** 14.379*** 29.846*** 58.990***
(0.290) (3.385) (6.338) (12.823) (0.404) (3.341) (7.769) (17.815)
Estimator FE logit FE Tobit Panel Tobit FE logit FE Tobit Panel Tobit
Time dummies 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 488 716 716 716 328 716 716 716
Notes: 
(1) Std. errors in parantheses.  Robust Std. errors in column (2) and (6)
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(3) A constant is included in all estimations.
days_delayed_cens_FY
(4) Same control variables as in standard specification included in all columns.
delayed_  
budget
  
days_delayed
days_delayed_cens
delayed_ 
budget_FY
  
days_delayed
_FY
i tUnempl drop ,_
i tUnempl increase ,_
i tDivided Gov ,_
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